US Seen As Culpable in Russia - Georgia Conflict

File this in the folder marked "Oh Magoo!  You've Done It Again!"

Bumbling by the Bush administration which was specifically asked to slow up Kosovo Independence and work on the problem with South Ossetia and Abkhazia helped create the current crisis.  Other actions by the Bush administration also gave the Georgian leader the idea that the US would hold back Russia if Georgia took action on its breakaway province.

See Steve Clemons' The Washington Note "Georgia-Russia Clash: American Culpability and the Kosovo Connection" 

I'll excerpt a brief portion of Mr. Clemon's conclusion, though the entire piece and site is easily read and requires little bandwidth. 

While the seeds of this conflict between Georgia and Russia had been planted long ago, the U.S. helped engineer events that are now undermining its own interests and the global perception of American power.

When the media report on what drove this "war", commentators should look to Kosovo as well as Saakashvili's own recklessness and overconfidence to further understand the reasons why tanks from both sides rolled into South Ossetia.

 Read the entire piece.  Clemons knows what he's talking about.

The New York Times' analysis "In Georgia and Russia, a Perfect Brew for a Blowup " by C.J. Chivers  shows more Russia experts piling on about US role in encouraging Georgia to take reckless actions: 

Several other long-term factors had also contributed to the possibility of war. They included the Kremlin’s military successes in Chechnya, which gave Russia the latitude and sense of internal security it needed to free up troops to cross its borders, and the exuberant support of the United States for President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, a figure loathed by the Kremlin on both personal and political terms.

Moreover, by preparing Georgian soldiers for duty in Iraq, the United States appeared to have helped embolden Georgia, if inadvertently, to enter a fight it could not win.

...

...Russian specialists, ...said that, whatever the merits of Mr. Saakashvili’s positions, his impulsiveness and nationalism sometimes outstripped his common sense.

The risks were intensified by the fact that the United States did not merely encourage Georgia’s young democracy, it helped militarize the weak Georgian state.

In his wooing of Washington as he came to power, Mr. Saakashvili firmly embraced the missions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. At first he had almost nothing practical to offer. Georgia’s military was small, poorly led, ill-equipped and weak.

But Mr. Saakashvili’s rise coincided neatly with a swelling American need for political support and foreign soldiers in Iraq. His offer of troops was matched with a Pentagon effort to overhaul Georgia’s forces from bottom to top.

At senior levels, the United States helped rewrite Georgian military doctrine and train its commanders and staff officers. At the squad level, American marines and soldiers trained Georgian soldiers in the fundamentals of battle.

Georgia, meanwhile, began re-equipping its forces with Israeli and American firearms, reconnaissance drones, communications and battlefield-management equipment, new convoys of vehicles and stockpiles of ammunition.

The public goal was to nudge Georgia toward NATO military standards. Privately, Georgian officials welcomed the martial coaching and buildup, and they made clear that they considered participation in Iraq as a sure way to prepare the Georgian military for “national reunification” — the local euphemism of choice for restoring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgian control.

All of these policies collided late last week. One American official who covers Georgian affairs, speaking on the condition of anonymity while the United States formulates its next public response, said that everything had gone wrong.

Mr. Saakashvili had acted rashly, he said, and had given Russia the grounds to invade. The invasion, he said, was chilling, disproportionate and brutal, and it was grounds for a strong censure. But the immediate question was how far Russia would go in putting Georgia back into what it sees as Georgia’s place.

The conclusion is a lot like Steve Clemons' (not surprising since the two men have contacts with a lot  informed Washington insiders).

American officials and a military officer who have dealt with Georgia said privately ... the war risked becoming a foreign policy catastrophe for the United States, whose image and authority in the region were in question after it had proven unable to assist Georgia or to restrain the Kremlin while the Russian Army pressed its attack.

tags: south ossetia  russia  georgia  bush administration  bush  condi rice  

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